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Abstract—Since the telecommunication market becomes more
complex and dynamic, a strong need for a new, eﬃcient and
ﬂexible bandwidth trading mechanisms appears. We believe
that good mechanisms, that allow eﬀective and fair allocation
of bandwidth between market participants will help to de-
velop the real competitive bandwidth market. In this paper we
compare two diﬀerent double-sided bandwidth auction mech-
anisms, that seem to be well suited approaches for trading in-
divisible units of bandwidth: combinatorial auction c-SeBiDA
and multicommodity mechanism BACBR-I. The c-SeBiDA
mechanism considers two types of commodities: inter-node
links and paths consisting of particular links. Market partici-
pants may bid a single link, or a bundle of links, constituting
a speciﬁc path. The BACBR-I mechanism is a multicommod-
ity exchange model, that allows bidders to place buy oﬀers not
only for individual or bundled links, but rather for end-to-end
connections. Therefore, it is the decision model that allocates
the most eﬃcient links to connections. We run a large set of
experiments to test the allocation and computational eﬃciency
obtained under both approaches.
Keywords—bandwidth allocation, combinatorial auction, com-
putational efficiency, indivisible resources, multicommodity
trade.
1. Introduction
We consider a multilateral network resources market. The
market is supplied by many participants such as compa-
nies laying cables, network providers and other telecom-
munication link owners. The customers of the market are
service providers (ISP, ASP, etc.), geographically spread or-
ganization and also network providers who want to expand
their network coverage. We assume that sellers oﬀer sin-
gle telecommunication links and buyers want to purchase
bandwidth between two nodes that may not necessarily be
directly connected by single link. Requirement of trading
end-to-end connections makes the allocation problem com-
binatorial, because bandwidth demand can be realized by
several network links.
After the debacle of Enron Broadband Services in fall
2001 the development of organized market for bandwidth
slowed down. Currently, the dominating form of band-
width trading are bilateral agreements in which two par-
ticipants negotiate the contract terms. The negotiations are
complex, nontransparent and time consuming. This form
of bandwidth trading requires a business relationships and
often it is ineﬃcient both globally and individually (espe-
cially for participants that have not relevant business rela-
tionships). The buyer that wants to purchase bandwidth be-
tween two nodes connected by a sequence of links owned
by diﬀerent providers must independently negotiate with
all of them. If the negotiation fails with one of them
(whereas agreements with other sellers would be drawn
up and signed), the buyer will get useless bandwidth as
it will not ensure the connection between selected nodes.
Also even if the buyer manage to purchase bandwidth along
some path connecting chosen nodes, there is a risk that
this path would not be the cheapest one from all existing
paths between this nodes. Thus there is a need of designing
more sophisticated market mechanisms that will not have
such severe drawbacks that are involved with bilateral
agreements. Lately analysis of bandwidth market collapse
in 2001 gives promise of emerging new forms of band-
width trading in the future thanks to especially technologies
like global managed private line (GMPLS) and automatic
switched optical network/automatic switched transport
network (ASON/ASTN) [1], [2].
In this paper we focus on auction based market mecha-
nisms. We analyze two bandwidth auctions: combinatorial
sellers’ bid double auction (c-SeBiDA) [3] and model for
balancing aggregated communication bandwidth resources
with indivisible constraint (BACBR-I) that is an exten-
sion of balancing aggregated communication bandwidth re-
sources (BACBR) model [4]. Our aim is to compare the
allocation and computational eﬃciency of aforementioned
mechanisms. In Section 2 we present considered mecha-
nisms in terms of general properties of auction and the ap-
plied approach of supporting end-to-end connection trad-
ing. In Section 3 we formulate mathematical models of
c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I. Section 4 contains experimental
results. Section 5 summarizes our ﬁndings.
2. Bandwidth Auction Properties
2.1. General Properties
There are diﬀerent types of auctions. The c-SeBiDA and
BACBR-I mechanisms can be classiﬁed according to the
auction taxonomy presented in [5] as single-round, socially
eﬃcient and double-sided auction of indivisible goods.
Single-round auction are conducted in a single step. Band-
width market participants submit their oﬀers and the auc-
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Fig. 1. Diﬀerent types of supporting end-to-end connection trading: (a) network topology; (b) explicit single path speciﬁcation;
(c) explicit set of admissible paths speciﬁcation; (d) implicit all possible path speciﬁcation.
tion mechanism determine an allocation. Other type of
auction is progressive one that is carried out in rounds.
Progressive auction of bandwidth is proposed in [6].
Double-sided auction concerns multilateral exchange. It
can be applied on the bandwidth market where there are
many sellers and many buyers. Models for one-sided band-
width auction (with one seller and many buyers) can be
found in [5]–[7].
Auction is socially eﬃcient when it aims at maximizing
social welfare. Social eﬃciency is usually a goal of market
mechanisms for bandwidth trading, especially for double-
sided auctions. In case of one-sided bandwidth auction
also other goals are taken into account, i.e. maximization
of seller’s revenue [5], [6].
Indivisible goods are integral and cannot be exchanged par-
tially. Bandwidth may be treated as indivisible (modular)
commodity. In real networks links often consist of modules
that refer to speciﬁc transmission and encoding or framing
schemes. This modules have determined capacity, i.e., T1 –
1.52 Mbit/s, E1 – 2.04 Mbit/s, OC-3 – 155.52 Mbit/s [8].
Above data transfer standards tend to form standardized
contracts on bandwidth market that also use pre-speciﬁed
amounts of bandwidth [9]. However there are market mech-
anisms that assume that bandwidth is available in any real
fraction of Mbit/s [7], [10].
2.2. Supporting End-to-End Connection Trading
In case of bandwidth auction the essential property is how
it supports end-to-end connections trading. We can distin-
guish three approaches: explicit single path speciﬁcation,
explicit set of admissible paths speciﬁcation, implicit all
possible path speciﬁcation. All this approaches are illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Consider network presented in Fig. 1(a)
and suppose that buyer wants to purchase bandwidth be-
tween nodes A and C. This end-to-end connection has three
possible realizations by following sequences of links: L1–
L3, L2–L4 and L1–L5–L4.
The ﬁrst way of supporting end-to-end connection trading
relies on explicitly specifying a single path that connects
selected nodes. In considered example it can be a path
L1–L3 (see Fig. 1(b)). The mechanism should guarantee
that the same amount of bandwidth will be allocated at
link L1 and L2. This approach is employed by the
c-SeBiDA that enables the buyer to submit oﬀer concerning
bundle of links constituting particular path. Thus c-SeBiDA
is a combinatorial auction. However, explicit single path
speciﬁcation can be also implemented in diﬀerent manner,
i.e., by simultaneous multi-unit dutch auctions [6].
The second approach is more ﬂexible than the ﬁrst one be-
cause it enables to specify a set of admissible paths that
can be used to realize end-to-end connection. In consid-
ered example buyer may stipulate two paths L1–L3 and
L2–L4 (see Fig. 1(c)). The mechanism may allocate dif-
ferent amount of bandwidth at each path, i.e., 90% of de-
manded bandwidth at path L1–L3 and the rest 10% at path
L2–L4, but the summary bandwidth allocated at all paths
must be not greater than the buyer’s demand. This way
of supporting end-to-end connection trading is proposed
in [5], [7].
The last approach is the most ﬂexible from the buyer point
of view as it enables implicitly speciﬁcation of all possible
paths by submitting oﬀer directly at pair of nodes posing
the source and target of end-to-end connection. In con-
sidered example, buyer speciﬁes in the oﬀer only source
and target of end-to-end connection – appropriately nodes
A and C (see Fig. 1(d)). The mechanism itself decides
which links are used for realizing this demand. The end-
to-end connection between nodes A and C may be realized
by several sequence of links, i.e., 40% of demanded band-
width is served by L1–L3, 50% by L2–L4 and 10% by
L1–L5–L4. The BACBR-I applies this approach. It deﬁnes
two types of commodities: links that are oﬀered for sale and
end-to-end connections which are the subject of demand.
The buyer that submits an oﬀer for end-to-end connection
gets bandwidth at links that generally pose a ﬂow between
two selected nodes.
2.3. Auction Rules
Auction mechanism speciﬁes information that market par-
ticipants must include in their oﬀers. This information is
leveraged by two rules of mechanism: allocation rule and
pricing rule. Allocation rule decides which oﬀers are ac-
cepted. Pricing rule deﬁnes the buyers’ charges and sellers’
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incomes. Both this rules are necessary for clearing the
market.
The c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I are single-round, socially ef-
ﬁcient and double-sided auction of bandwidth considered
as indivisible good. The essential diﬀerence between this
two mechanisms is in the way of supporting trading end-
to-end connections. Our goal is to study how this diﬀerent
approaches aﬀects allocation and computational eﬃciency
of this mechanism. Thus further we analyze only allocation
rule of considered mechanisms because it is the one that im-
plements the method of end-to-end connection trading and
responds for determining optimal value of the social wel-
fare. Nonetheless, it is worth to mention that pricing rule
also aﬀects mechanism eﬃciency as it decides if mecha-
nism gives incentives for truthful bidding. Here we assume
that market participants are truthful, so the allocation rule
is maximizing substantial social welfare.
3. Mathematical Models
3.1. Notation
The c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I allocation rules can be formu-
lated as mixed integer linear problems. Below we present
notation used in both mathematical programming models:
sets:
B buy oﬀers,
S sell oﬀers,
E network links,
S(e) sell oﬀers concerning link e ∈ E , S(e)⊆ S,
D end-to-end connections1,
B(d) buy oﬀers concerning end-to-end connection d ∈D,
B(d)⊆ B1,
V network nodes1
parameters:
zmaxm maximum units of bandwidth oﬀered for purchase
according to buy oﬀer m ∈ B,
Em unit price of buy oﬀer m ∈ B,
zmaxl maximum units of bandwidth oﬀered for sale ac-
cording to sell oﬀer l ∈ S,
Sl unit price of sell oﬀer l ∈ S,
bem = 1 if link e ∈ E belongs to bundle for which buy
oﬀer m ∈ B is submitted,
= 0 otherwise2,
Md indivisible unit size of end-to-end connection
d ∈D1,
Me indivisible unit size of link e ∈ E1,
ave = 1 if node v ∈V is source of link e ∈ E ,
=−1 if node v ∈V is target of e ∈ E ,
= 0 otherwise1,
sd source of end-to-end connection d ∈ D1,
td target of end-to-end connection d ∈ D1;
1 Only relevant to BACBR-I model.
2 Only relevant to c-SeBiDA model.
variables:
zm realization of buy oﬀer m ∈ B,
zl realization of sell oﬀer l ∈ S,
xed bandwidth ﬂow serving end-to-end connection
d ∈ D allocated to network link e ∈ E1.
Both c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I collect all buy (B) and sell
(S) oﬀers. They require that each buy oﬀer m ∈ B con-
tains the maximum buy unit price Em and the maximum
units of bandwidth oﬀered for purchase zmaxm . Similarly
each sell oﬀer l ∈ S has to include the minimum sell unit
price Sl and the maximum units of bandwidth oﬀered for
sale zmaxl . According to this two parameters of submitted
oﬀers considered mechanisms determine the optimal allo-
cation speciﬁed by variables zm and zl .
3.2. The c-SeBiDA Model
The c-SeBiDA model assumes that sell and buy oﬀers con-
cern network links (E). Sell oﬀer regards single link. For
each link many sell oﬀers can be submitted (S(e)). Buy of-
fer is combinatorial and it regards bundle of links (deﬁned
by parameters bem).
The mathematical model of the c-SeBiDA is following:
ˆQ = max
(
∑
m∈B
Emzm−∑
l∈S
Slzl
)
, (1)
0≤ zm ≤ zmaxm , ∀m∈B , (2)
0≤ zl ≤ zmaxl , ∀l∈S , (3)
zm ∈ Z, ∀m∈B , (4)
∑
m∈B
bemzm ≤ ∑
l∈S(e)
zl , ∀e∈E . (5)
The aim of c-SeBiDA is maximizing social welfare. Thus
objective function is deﬁned by Eq. (1), where ˆQ denotes
optimal value of social welfare. First two constraints (2)
and (3) set lower and upper bounds of buy and sell oﬀers
realizations, respectively. Next constraint (4) ensures that
buy oﬀer realization is integral. Sell oﬀers realization will
be integral due to constraint (5) which assure that aggre-
gated demand for link is not greater than aggregated supply
of bandwidth for that link. More details about c-SeBiDA
can be found in [3].
3.3. The BACBR-I Model
The BACBR-I model considers two types of commodities:
network links (E) and end-to-end connections (D). Each
link and end-to-end connection has predeﬁned module size
in which its bandwidth can be traded (respectively, Me and
Md parameters). Sell oﬀer regards single link and for each
link many sell oﬀers can be submitted (S(e)). Buy oﬀer
concerns single end-to-end connection and for each con-
nection many buy oﬀers can be submitted (B(d)). Because
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Fig. 2. Network topologies [11]: (a) network sun; (b) network janos-us; (c) network giul39.
BACBR-I itself chooses the links that realize particular end-
to-end connection (xed), it must have an information about
network topology. Thus, a set of network nodes (V ) and
incidence matrix elements (ave) are given. Also for end-
to-end connections source (sd) and target (td) nodes are
speciﬁed.
The mathematical model of the BACBR-I is following:
ˆQ = max
(
∑
m∈B
Emzm−∑
l∈S
Slzl
)
, (6)
0≤ zm ≤ zmaxm , ∀m∈B , (7)
0≤ zl ≤ zmaxl , ∀l∈S , (8)
zm ∈ Z, ∀m∈B , (9)
zl ∈ Z, ∀l∈S , (10)
∑
d∈D
xed ≤ ∑
l∈S(e)
Mezl , ∀e∈E (11)
0 ≤ xed , ∀e∈E,d∈D (12)
∑
e∈E
avexed =


∑
m∈B(d)
Mdzm v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
− ∑
m∈B(d)
Mdzm v = td
, ∀v∈V,d∈D (13)
First four equations in BACBR-I model Eqs. (6)–(9) are
the same as in the c-SeBiDA. It stems from the fact that
BACBR-I also maximizes social welfare and restricts oﬀers
realizations according to their maximum volumes. Con-
straint (10) imposes that sell oﬀer realization is integral.
Next two constraints ensure that total bandwidth ﬂow at
particular link will not be greater than aggregated realiza-
tions of sell oﬀers concerning this link, constraint (11) and
that bandwidth ﬂow at all links will be non-negative, con-
straint (12). Equation (12) is a ﬂow conservation constraint
that must be met for each end-to-end connection.
Comparing above models, both of them maximize social
welfare on the basis of submitted oﬀers that contain unit
price and maximum volume. Both models treat bandwidth
as indivisible good and support trading end-to-end connec-
tions. The BACBR-I and c-SeBiDA diﬀers in the way of
supporting end-to-end connection trading. Moreover, the
BACBR-I is more comprehensive than c-SeBiDA, as it en-
ables trading network resources consisting of modules with
diﬀerent size.
4. Experimental Studies
4.1. Test Instances
Experimental studies have been conducted on several
test instances which are based on data from survivable
network design library (SNDlib) available on the web
site [11]. Although the SNDlib is a set of survivable ﬁxed
telecommunication network design problems, it provides
information that is very important in bandwidth trading
problems: network topology and a set of end-to-end con-
nections. We consider three networks from SNDlib: sun,
janos-us and giul39. Topologies of this networks are pre-
sented in Fig. 2. Table 1 contains the number of nodes,
links and end-to-end connections for each considered
network.
Table 1
Information about size of considered networks
Network Nodes Links
End-to-end
connections
sun 27 102 67
janos-us 26 84 650
giul39 39 172 1471
Bandwidth allocation test instance besides aforementioned
data requires speciﬁcation of oﬀers that are submitted for
network resources. Oﬀers have been generated according
to the following rules:
– summarized bandwidth oﬀered for sale (purchase) at
link (end-to-end connection) equals the link capac-
ity (end-to-end connection demand value) given by
SNDlib;
– unit price of oﬀer concerning link (end-to-end con-
nection) is determined on the basis of the distance
between nodes connected by this link (end-to-end
connection) and some random factor that is used to
diﬀerentiate prices of oﬀers regarding the same link
(end-to-end connection).
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So also some other data from SNDlib such as nodes co-
ordinates (used to calculate distance between nodes), links
capacities, end-to-end connections demands come in use-
ful for preparing test instances of bandwidth allocation
problem.
For each network three oﬀer variants have been gener-
ated with diﬀerent average number of oﬀers submitted for
single link or end-to-end connection, respectively, 2, 4
and 6 oﬀers per link or end-to-end connection. In all, nine
test instances of bandwidth allocation problem have been
prepared. All of them have been adjusted to the c-SeBiDA
mechanism in which buy oﬀers are submitted not for end-
to-end connections, but for bundles of links. For each buy
oﬀer a sequence of links has to be speciﬁed that realizes
suitable end-to-end connection. As a realization of end-to-
end connection we choose randomly one of the three least
expensive path realizations. Because end-to-end connec-
tion realization aﬀects the social welfare obtained by the
c-SeBiDA, we consider ﬁve variations of each test instance
in which buy oﬀers are submitted for diﬀerent sequence of
links realizing particular end-to-end connection. All test in-
stances have been implemented in multicommodity market
data model (M3 ) [12].
4.2. Allocation Efficiency
The comparison of allocation eﬃciency obtained by both
c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I mechanisms in all test instances
is given in Table 2. Test instance is identiﬁed by network
name and average number of oﬀers submitted for single
link or end-to-end connection. Table 2 does not contain
Table 2
Comparison of c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I allocation
eﬃciency
Network Oﬀers BACBR-I
c-SeBiDA
max avg. min
sun
2 1 0.77 0.75 0.73
4 1 0.77 0.72 0.65
6 1 0.83 0.81 0.81
janos-us
2 1 0.84 0.8 0.77
4 1 0.85 0.82 0.79
6 1 0.86 0.84 0.81
giul39
2 1 0.8 0.79 0.79
4 1 0.78 0.78 0.77
6 1 0.82 0.81 0.81
the numerical values of social welfare achieved by both
mechanisms, but only the relation between them assum-
ing that social welfare determined by BACBR-I equals 1.
Because in case of the c-SeBiDA mechanism we analyze
ﬁve diﬀerent variations of bundles of links generated for
buy oﬀers the maximium, average and minimum social wel-
fare obtained by this mechanism in proportion to BACBR-I
optimal allocation is presented.
Allocation eﬃciency of the c-SeBiDA is on average about
80% of BACBR-I allocation eﬃciency. In the best case
social welfare achieved by c-SeBiDA accounts for 86% of
social welfare determined BACBR-I. In case of network
sun with 4 oﬀers per single link or end-to-end connection
on average the c-SeBiDA obtains only 65% of social wel-
fare provided by BACBR-I.
4.3. Computational Efficiency
Table 3 presents information about number of variables and
constraints of mathematical models related to particular
mechanism and test instance identiﬁed by network name
and average number of oﬀers submitted for single link or
Table 3
Number of variables (var.) and constraints (con.) in
c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I mathematical models
Network Oﬀers
BACBR-I c-SeBiDA
var. con. var. con.
sun
2 7169 2581 335 772
4 7515 3273 681 1464
6 7864 3971 1030 2162
janos-us
2 56052 19888 1452 2988
4 57606 22996 3006 6096
6 59016 25816 4416 8916
giul39
2 256280 64077 3268 6708
4 259589 70695 6577 13326
6 262858 77233 9846 19864
end-to-end connection. The BACBR-I mathematical model
has more variables and constraints than the c-SeBiDA
model. The diﬀerence is substantial for the largest network
giul39 with average 2 oﬀers per link or end-to-end connec-
tion. In this test instance the BACBR-I model has about
80 and 10 times more variables and constraints, respec-
tively, than the c-SeBiDA model.
The comparison of computational eﬃciency of c-SeBiDA
and BACBR-I is given in Table 4. The table presents the
time of solving mixed-integer linear programming prob-
Table 4
Comparison of c-SeBiDA and BACBR-I
allocation time [s]
Network Oﬀers BACBR-I c-SeBiDA
sun
2 0.7 0.02
4 0.89 0.02
6 0.92 0.02
janos-us
2 15.8 0.05
4 15.93 0.03
6 14.19 0.07
giul39
2 499.01 0.05
4 526.39 0.09
6 512.71 0.17
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lems related to considered test instances. Optimization has
been performed by CPLEX 9.1 on computer with processor
Intel Core2 Duo T8100 2.1 GHz, main memory 3 GB and
32-bit operating system MS Vista.
The BACBR-I mechanism requires more time than
c-SeBiDA to determine optimal allocation. It is meaningful
in case of the largest network giul39, for which BACBR-I
model must ﬁnd optimal allocation of links bandwidth for
great number of end-to-end connections. Complexity of
this task is reﬂected by the large number of variables and
constraints of the BACBR-I model. It is worth noting that
the allocation time of both mechanism is not rising a lot
with increase of average number of oﬀers submitted for
single link or end-to-end connection.
5. Summary
This paper compares two single-round, socially eﬃcient
and double-sided auctions of indivisible network resources
that represents diﬀerent approaches of supporting end-to-
end connection trading. The c-SeBiDA is a combinatorial
auction that requires explicit single path speciﬁcation pos-
ing realization of particular end-to-end connection. The
BACBR-I enables submitting buy oﬀers for pair of nodes
that are the source and target of end-to-end connection.
The former mechanism requires that buyer knows a network
topology and chooses appropriate links. Explicit bundle of
links speciﬁcation in buy oﬀers aﬀects allocation eﬃciency
of the c-SeBiDA which provides on average 20% less so-
cial welfare than the BACBR-I mechanism. The BACBR-I
itself allocates the bandwidth links to the buyer assuring
connections between selected nodes. It provides highest
allocation eﬃciency, however, it requires more time to de-
termine optimal allocation than the c-SeBiDA.
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